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MARKET ACCESS AND INDIVIDUAL WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
Laura Hering and Sandra Poncet*
Abstract—We consider the effect of geography on wages using individual
data from 56 Chinese cities. We present a simple new economic geogra-
phy model that links wages to individual characteristics and market
access. The latter is calculated as a transport cost weighted sum of
surrounding locations’ market capacity. After controlling for individual
skills and local factor endowments, we find that a significant fraction of
the interindividual differences in returns to labor can be explained by the
geography of market access. We further find greater wage sensitivity to
market access for highly skilled workers and for workers in private and,
particularly, foreign-owned firms.
I. Introduction
SINCE the establishment of the People’s Republic ofChina in 1949, income inequality has been an important
and sensitive political issue. However, although the country
is still influenced by Maoist egalitarian ideology, unprece-
dented income growth over the past two decades has
brought with it large and still-rising income inequality in
China (Meng, Gregory, & Wang, 2005). Coastal provinces
are known for their wealth and development and inland
regions for their backwardness and poverty. A core-
periphery structure of the income gradient across regions,
whereby regions with low per capita income are predomi-
nantly located at the economic periphery and those with the
highest income at the economic center, has long been
observed in many different countries, and this same struc-
ture is also becoming apparent in China (Lin, 2005). Most
analysis and policies regarding spatial inequality in China
have concentrated on the gap between the eastern and
western provinces. The literature on heterogeneity within
these regions has focused on the contrast between rural and
urban areas (Wei & Wu, 2002). However, the ongoing
growth of intraprovincial disparities has led researchers and
policymakers to become increasingly interested in the ori-
gins of this new phenomenon (Ravallion & Chen, 2007).
A number of reasons may lie behind the failure of income
levels to converge. Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008)
note that three broad sets of explanations are frequently
invoked to explain persistent spatial wage disparities: spa-
tial differences in the skill composition of the workforce,
differences in nonhuman endowments, and differences in
interactions between workers or firms. While controlling for
the first two factors, our paper aims to explain intranational
and intraprovincial disparities through the lens of new
economic geography (NEG), applied to individual data. The
literature on NEG explains the emergence of a heteroge-
neous economic space by appealing to transport costs and
increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1991; Krugman &
Venables, 1995). One of its central tenets is the importance
of proximity to consumers, as represented by the region’s
market access, which is typically defined as the distance-
weighted sum of the market capacity of surrounding loca-
tions (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999). The NEG “wage
equation” then models nominal wages as a function of the
region’s market access. Wages are predicted to be higher at
the economic center and lower at the periphery. Since
locations closer to consumer markets enjoy lower transport
costs, firms based in these locations can afford to pay higher
wages and still break even.
Both theoretical developments and growing empirical
evidence in the field of NEG have confirmed the impact of
proximity to markets on nominal wages (Head & Mayer,
2004; Redding & Venables, 2003, 2004; Hanson, 2005).
One prerequisite of any analysis of the determinants of
regional wages is sufficient controls for individual charac-
teristics like skill or gender, which are among the main
determinants of interindividual wage heterogeneity (Mincer,
1974; Willis, 1986; Combes et al., 2008).1
Mion and Naticchioni (2005) and Combes et al. (2008)
use individual data to estimate the impact of market prox-
imity on wages, emphasizing the importance of the spatial
sorting of skills in explaining wage disparities. These anal-
yses appeal to a fairly crude measure of market access,
based on Harris (1954),2 which is not directly derived from
NEG theory and may, for this reason, overestimate the role
of surrounding markets on local wages (Head & Mayer,
2006).
A structural derivation of market access was first offered
by Redding and Venables (2004), who estimated the impact
of market access on the cross-country variation in 1996 per
capita income. Head and Mayer (2006) showed that educa-
tional differences have to be taken into account in their
analysis of regional wages across the EU, since not control-
ling for education runs the risk of incorrectly attributing
wage disparities to economic geography factors.3 They
propose a human capital–augmented version of the wage
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1 The importance of controlling for differences in worker quality is
underlined in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005), who derive a general
test of relative factor price equality across the United States that is robust
to unobservable regional factor quality differences.
2 See section IVA for the definition of the Harris market potential.
3 Because workers with better unobservable characteristics are more
likely to be located in more central areas, wage disparities across areas
may be wrongly attributed to agglomeration economies. This would
induce an upward bias in the estimated coefficient on market access. In
addition, beside the direct effect, remoteness may hamper the accumula-
tion of human capital, aggravating the wage disadvantage of peripheral
regions (Redding & Schott, 2003). As Breinlich (2006) argued, this will be
the case if intermediate and transport cost-intensive goods use relatively
more skilled labor. More central locations will then offer higher wages for
skilled labor, which increases the incentives for human capital accumu-
lation.
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equation, which has now become the standard approach (see
Breinlich, 2006, for an application to the EU, and Lin, 2005,
and Ma, 2006, with respect to China).
Other articles have applied cruder measures of market
access to aggregate data to explain the impact of market
proximity on income: Mion (2004) for Italy, De Bruyne
(2003) for Belgium, Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm
(2004) for Germany, and Amiti and Cameron (2007) for
Indonesia. Only the last two of these papers control for
differences in education levels.
Most of the papers cited that include a human capital
indicator do so using a measure of average education level.
Although this is a substantial improvement, these indicators
fail to account for the distribution of education within the
labor force. Moreover, this approach does not capture other
worker characteristics, such as work experience or gender,
whose importance has been emphasized by labor econo-
mists (Mincer, 1974; Willis, 1986). To our knowledge, our
paper is one out of only two, together with Paillacar (2006),4
combining these different strands of literature to estimate a
structural model of wages with individual data. Microlevel
data allow us to control for skill composition, other indi-
vidual features, and firm characteristics before we investi-
gate whether wages respond to the economic geography of
their location. A further advantage of this approach is that it
can alleviate the potential problem of endogeneity of market
access since it is less likely that a shock to an individual
wage translates into any change in local market access.5
Most of the empirical work applying NEG theory has
covered developed countries. However, the agglomeration
forces studied by NEG are of particular interest in devel-
oping countries. In China, due to increasing integration into
the world economy, these forces are expected to have a
major impact on the spatial structure of economic activity,
influencing factor localization and therefore factor prices
within the country. Recent empirical work on NEG in China
includes Amiti and Javorcik (2008), who use firm-level data
to analyze the determinants of foreign-firm entry across
Chinese provinces within an NEG framework and under-
score the importance of supplier and market access.
China is an especially interesting country in which to test
the wage equation. According to economic theory, migra-
tion leads to factor-price equalization. In China, migration is
officially restricted, and the urban labor market is strictly
segmented between urban and rural workers.6 Any change
in demand for local goods is therefore much more likely to
lead to wage adjustment than to adjustment in the number of
workers. Hence, a city facing an increase in its demand
would not necessarily be able to adjust employment and
would therefore experience a rise in wages.7 Consequently,
variations in market access across Chinese cities are likely
to be reflected in wage differentials. Lin (2005) was the first
to examine the influence of proximity to demand and supply
in China. She finds, based on aggregate data, that greater
proximity is associated with higher average provincial real
wages. A similar analysis by Ma (2006) concentrates on the
impact of market and supplier access on wages in foreign-
invested firms. However, the empirical analysis of both Lin
and Ma is limited to international markets and does not take
into account local demand.
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the
relationship between market access and spatial inequality in
China, as we also integrate domestic trade flows into out
calculation of market access. In addition, the calculation of
city-level market access allows us to analyze inequalities
within provinces. Further, the use of a household survey
means that we can control for individual- and firm-level
characteristics, as well as alternative explanations of spatial
wage disparities, such as scale economies and factor endow-
ments. Finally, we analyze whether the impact of market
access depends on worker or firm characteristics.
Our results are based on a 1995 survey conducted by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Our data set covers
around 6,000 Chinese workers from 56 cities in eleven
provinces. We confirm that individual skills account for a
large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities in China.
We also find that a significant fraction of interindividual
differences in wages can be explained by the geography of
access to markets. After controlling for worker heterogene-
ity, factor endowments, and industry and provincial charac-
teristics, our estimate of the elasticity of individual wages to
market access is 0.14. This figure lies between that of 0.1
obtained by Head and Mayer (2006) and the coefficient of
around 0.3 found by Redding and Venables (2004), both
estimated using aggregate data. Growing differences in
trade costs or market size between Chinese cities can
therefore lead to increasing wage disparities within prov-
inces. On average, a 1 standard deviation increase in the
market access of a city leads to a rise in individual wages of
29%.
In the public debate, China is often presented as a country
with a quasi-infinite labor supply to the manufacturing
sector. If this were the case, wages in China would not
respond much to international and local markets. One im-
plication of our results is that wages in China actually
respond to market access in a strikingly similar manner to
that observed in industrialized countries. The Chinese labor
market, from this point of view, does not seem fundamen-
tally different.
4 Paillacar (2006) uses Brazilian data.
5 Hanson (2005) argues that when the dependent variable is at the finest
possible level, shocks in the error term will be less likely to affect the
independent variable. Moreover, if the explanatory variables are aggre-
gated to a higher level, endogeneity will again be less likely, since shocks
to individual variables do not substantially affect regional variables.
6 See Banister (2005) for more details on the Chinese labor market.
7 Although the lack of jobs in the countryside forces millions of people
each year to abandon agriculture and migrate to richer parts of the country,
mainly to towns, to find work in urban industries (Ping & Pieke, 2003),
their impact on urban wages might be negligible: the labor market is
strictly segmented and prevents migrants from obtaining access to urban
jobs or social security (Banister, 2005).
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We check whether the relationship between market ac-
cess and wages holds for all types of workers equally or
whether this relationship is valid only for certain firm types
or skill profiles. We find that highly skilled workers benefit
more from greater market access than do unskilled workers.
These results are consistent with the NEG model, which
predicts that the relationship between market access and
wages will be weaker as migration is stronger. The literature
on migration in China has shown that migrants in the
majority have low skills.
Also, the sensitivity of wages to market access varies
across firms according to their ownership type. We might
expect private, recently created firms to be more flexible in
terms of wages and to react more to market shocks than do
state-owned firms. We find that while wages in private, and
particularly in foreign, firms react strongly, wages in state-
owned enterprises are largely insensitive to the city’s market
access.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II outlines the theoretical framework from which
the econometric specifications used in the subsequent sec-
tions are derived and presents the two key relationships that
are estimated in this paper: the trade equation and the wage
equation. Section III describes the data and calculates mar-
ket access measures for Chinese cities. Section IV investi-
gates the extent to which wages in China respond to these
measures and carries out a number of robustness checks.
Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical anal-
ysis is a reduced version of a standard NEG model of
monopolistic competition based on Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), similar to that used by Fujita et al. (1999) and
Redding and Venables (2004). We consider a world with R
locations, composed of firms operating under increasing
returns to scale and producing differentiated manufactured
products. Consumers’ utility increases with the number of
varieties. The demand for differentiated products is modeled
in the usual symmetric constant elasticity of substitution
way, with  (  1) being the elasticity of substitution
between any pair of products.
The final demand for goods in location j is derived from
the maximization of the representative consumer’s CES
utility function.8 Country j’s demand for a variety produced
in r is
demandrj  prj
Ej
Gj1
, (1)
where Ej is location j’s total expenditure on manufactured
goods and prj is the price of varieties from location r sold in
j (consisting of the mill price pr and iceberg transportation
costs Trj between the two locations: prj  prTrj). Gj is the
aggregate price index for manufactured goods, Gj
 r1R nrprj11/1, with nr being the number of firms in
r. Taking into account that Trj units must be shipped in
order for one unit to arrive, we obtain the effective demand
xrj faced by a firm in r from location j:
xrj  TrjprjGj1Ej  Trj1prGj1Ej. (2)
As Redding and Venables (2004) demonstrated, the price
elasticity of demand is , and the term Gj1Ej shows the
position of the demand curve faced by each firm in market
j. This latter is referred to as the market capacity of country
j. It corresponds to local expenditure Ej adjusted for the
market-crowding effect Gj, which summarizes the number
of competing firms and the prices they charge. Intuitively, a
greater number of competitors, and thus a lower value of Gj,
will reduce the attractiveness of j for any firm exporting
there. Equation (2) underscores that trade costs influence
demand more when the elasticity of substitution is high. We
follow the literature in referring to rj  Trj1 as the
“phi-ness” of trade (see Baldwin et al., 2003). This can take
a value between 0 (when trade costs are prohibitive) and 1
(when trade costs are negligible). Summing over all prod-
ucts produced in location r, we obtain the trade equation
(Redding & Venables, 2004).
The total value of exports of region r to region j is
therefore
nrprxrj  nrpr1rjGj1Ej. (3)
As Redding and Venables (2003) emphasized, this equation
for bilateral trade flows provides a basis for estimating a
gravity trade model. While the last term on the right-hand
side of equation (3) reflects the market capacity of region j,
mj  Gj1Ej, the first term, nrpr1, measures what is
referred to as the supply capacity of the exporting region,
sr  nrpr1. This corresponds to the product of the number
of varieties and their price competitiveness.9
The bilateral trade flows in equation (3), which will serve
as the basis of the gravity equation estimated in section IV,
can therefore be rewritten as
nrprxrj  srrjmj. (4)
Turning to supply, we follow the standard assumptions of
the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. The differentiation costs
of varieties are supposed to be so small that each variety is
produced by only one firm.
Increasing returns at the firm level come from the com-
bination of a plant-specific fixed cost, fr, and a marginal cost
of production, cr, which is region specific (Head & Mayer,
8 See Fujita et al. (1999) for a complete statement of the underlying
model.
9 Redding and Venables (2003) discuss the concepts of market and
supply capacity in greater depth.
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2004). The cost of producing qr in each region is assumed
to take the form crqr  fr. Each firm maximizes gross
profit. The gross profit function of region r on each market
j is therefore rj  ( pr  cr)Trjqrj. The resulting mill price
for each origin r is a simple markup over marginal costs:
pr 
cr
  1 . (5)
All varieties produced in a given region r are thus valued at
the same price (before transport costs). The gross profit
earned in each market j for a variety produced in region r is
given by rj  prxrj/.
Substituting in equation (5), summing up the profits
earned in each market, and subtracting the fixed costs, fr, we
obtain the net profit in each potential location r:
r  
j
prxrj/  fr 
1

cr
1 
j
	rjGj1Ej
  fr.
(6)
Following the literature, we write

j
rjGj1Ej  
j
rjmj  MAr, (7)
where MAr is the market access of region r. This is simply
the sum of the market capacities of all destinations j, mj,
weighted by the measure of bilateral trade costs, rj, be-
tween r and j. This summarizes how well a location is
endowed with access to markets for the goods it produces.
The NEG literature highlights that firms in locations with
higher market access incur lower overall transportation
costs and are thus able to pay higher wages (Fujita et al.,
1999).10
We follow Head and Mayer (2006) in introducing worker
heterogeneity into the standard Krugman (1980) model,
assuming that labor is the only production factor, and
positing both a fixed, , and a variable, , component of
firm-level labor requirements. Apart from notation and the
inclusion of individual characteristics, we obtain what Fu-
jita et al. (1999) call the wage equation.11 This wage
equation is the second key relationship that will be esti-
mated in the next section:
wi  
j
rjGj1Ej
1
  1/ expzi
 MAr 1 1/ expzi, (8)
with z corresponding to worker i characteristics and  to
their returns in terms of wages.12 This equation illustrates
the two different ways in which a region r can adjust to a
shock, for example, an increase in its local demand, Er.
First, the number of firms and workers may increase, which
produces a change in the price index, Gj (quantity adjust-
ment). In this case, the adjustment takes place inside MAr
since Gr compensates for the change in Er and total market
access does not change. Alternatively, we see price adjust-
ment, where the number of firms and workers remains
unchanged and MAr therefore increases. Higher demand
drives prices up and is compensated by an increase in wages
to ensure that the zero-profit condition is maintained.
III. The Data
The aim of the empirical part of this paper is to see
whether this wage equation applies in the context of China.
We evaluate the extent to which proximity to markets can
explain interindividual wage heterogeneity and growing
wage disparities within Chinese provinces. In section IIIA,
we describe the data sources for the explained variable,
hourly wages at the individual level, as well as most of the
independent variables in our model. Section IIIB details
how our main variable of interest, market access, is con-
structed.
A. Individual Data
Our data come from the 1995 survey of the China
Household Income Project (CHIP). The data set was col-
lected by a team headed by the Institute of Economics, at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Riskin, Zhao, & Li,
2000, 2001).13 This survey covers 6,931 households and
21,694 individuals in urban China in eleven provinces.14 We
appeal to the theoretical model, which was developed in the
framework of manufactured goods, and apply it to a variety
of nonagricultural tradable good sectors (industry, transport
and communication, and commerce and trade).
10 As Head and Mayer (2006) pointed out, market access bears a close
resemblance to Harris’s (1954) market potential. The difference lies in the
fact that Harris’s market potential implicitly treats Gr, the price index, as
a constant and rj is approximated by 1/distrj. In this sense, the MAr is
real, not nominal, since it incorporates the notion that large markets that
are extremely well served by existing firms might offer considerably less
potential for profits than smaller markets with fewer competitors around
them.
11 See Head and Mayer (2006) for details of this derivation.
12 In the empirical section, we will proxy zi with information on gender,
age, education level, and years of experience at the individual level i. In
this latter case,  will show the percentage increase in wage from an extra
year of experience.
13 The Chinese Household Income Project is a joint research effort
sponsored by the Institute of Economics, at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, the Asian Development Bank, and the Ford Foundation.
Additional support was provided by the East Asian Institute, Columbia
University (Riskin, Zhao, & Li, 2000).
14 The sample includes the following provinces: Beijing, Shanxi, Lia-
oning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and
Hubei (see map A1).
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Our empirical work covers 6,848 workers from 56 cities15
in the eleven provinces, aged between sixteen and sixty, not
declared as self-employed, for whom the basic characteris-
tics of gender, age, work activity, years of schooling, and
years of work experience are not missing, and who are not
identified as outliers by the Hadi’s (1994) method.
Hourly wages, w, are calculated using information pro-
vided directly by the survey. Our annual wage variable,
expressed in yuan, is defined as the sum of the basic salary,
bonuses, subsidies (housing, medical, child care, and re-
gional subsidies), and other wages (overtime wages and
wages for special circumstances).16 To obtain hourly wages,
we use the information on the number of declared hours
worked per week and average number of days worked per
week, as well as the number of days unemployed per year.
Table A2 in appendix A reports descriptive statistics of
wages by province.
B. Independent Variable: Market Access
In our analysis, the key explanatory variable is market
access. As shown in equation (7), for each city c, market
access is defined as MAc  j cjGj1Ej. Since neither
market access itself nor its components, market capacity
(Gj1Ej) and freeness of trade (cj), are directly observ-
able, we rely on the two-step procedure pioneered by
Redding and Venables (2004). In this approach, the market
capacities, m, of international and national trading partners,
as well as transport costs, , can be estimated using a
gravity equation.
Taking natural logarithms in equation (4) yields the basic
econometric specification used for the trade equation, so the
total value of exports to region j from all firms based in
region r is given by
ln Xrj  nrprxij ln sr  ln rj  ln mj
 FXr  ln rj  FMj.
(9)
The empirical estimation of equation (9) provides us with
estimates of the two components of market access: freeness
of trade and market capacity. Importer fixed effects corre-
spond to the log of the unobserved market capacity of the
importer region j, FMj  ln mj  ln (Gj1Ej), while
exporter fixed effects (FXr) capture the log of the exporter’s
supply capacity, sr. We next estimate the gravity equation
and then use the parameter estimates from this regression to
calculate market access for each Chinese city.
Estimation of the Trade Equation. For the estimation of
the trade equation, we rely on a number of different data
sources to construct our bilateral trade flows data set cov-
ering intraprovincial, interprovincial, international, and in-
tranational trade flows.17
Since the most disaggregated level of bilateral trade data
is at the provincial level, we first estimate the trade equation
on the international and domestic trade flows of Chinese
provinces and international countries to predict their respec-
tive market capacities.
All trade flows are merged into a bilateral trade flows data
set covering 29 Chinese provinces and around 200 countries
of the rest of the world (ROW). The estimate of equation (9)
based on this complete data set allows us to compute the
market capacities of Chinese provinces and foreign coun-
tries based on their exports to all destinations (domestic and
international). Following previous work on border effects in
Chinese provinces, we allow for impediments to domestic
trade to be different from impediments to international trade
(Poncet, 2003).18 Transport costs, , in our gravity equation
are therefore assumed to depend on bilateral distances, and
a series of dummy variables indicating what type of border
is crossed.
Allowing border effects to vary according to trading
partners, equation (9) yields the following trade regression,
where B denotes dummies:
ln Xrj  FXr  FMj   ln distrj  Brj,r or jChinaforeign
 *Brj,r&jROWforeign  contigrj
 Brj,rj,r&jChinaprovincial
 Brj,rjROWintranational  rj.
(10)
This equation demonstrates the different types of transport
costs according to whether trade occurs between a Chinese
province and foreign countries ( ln distrj    Con-
tigrj), between two foreign countries ( ln distrj  * 
Contigrj), between a Chinese province and the rest of
China ( ln distrj  ), within foreign countries ( ln
distrj  ), or within Chinese provinces ( ln distrj).19 In
these last two cases, only internal distance affects the
freeness of trade. The accessibility of a Chinese province or
a foreign country to itself is modeled as the average distance
between producers and consumers in a stylized representa-
tion of regional geography, which gives rr  distrr 
(2/3area/), where  is the estimate on distance in the
trade equation.
15 See table A1 for the complete list of cities.
16 To address the concern that our empirical results in section IV may be
driven by differences in the sources of compensation, we run estimations
with different wage definitions. The results, available on the S.P.’s Web
site (http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/sponcet/), do not change accord-
ing to the inclusion of exclusion of subsidies and other income from the
work unit.
17 See appendix B for details of the data sources for the trade flows and
production indicators for Chinese provinces and international countries
used to estimate the trade equation.
18 This article finds domestic and international border effects of Chinese
provinces to be around 27  [exp(3.30)] and 400  [exp(6)], respectively,
in 1997. The figure of 27 means that individuals in a given province
consume 27 times more local products than products from other Chinese
provinces. See Poncet (2003, 2005) for more on the existence, level, and
evolution of impediments to interprovincial trade flows in China.
19 Where distrj denotes the great circle distance between r and j.
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Being neighbors dampens the border effect (contigrj  1
for pairs of partners that are contiguous).
Equation (10) is estimated for 1997,20 yielding country-
or region-specific estimates to construct Chinese provinces’
market access. The results are shown in table A3.21 Our
estimated distance coefficient is similar to those found in the
related literature, as is the impact of contiguity. We confirm
the finding in Poncet (2003) that the border effect inside
China is important. We furthermore find impediments to
trade to be greater between China and the rest of the world
than between countries included in our sample (which are
mostly members of the WTO and are therefore much more
integrated in the world economy in the 1990s than was
China). Map A1 in appendix A shows the distribution of the
estimated provincial market capacities.
Calculating Market Access. The data set on wages
gives the location of each individual by reporting his or her
province and city of registration.22 To compute the market
access of cities, we apply Head and Mayer’s (2006) alloca-
tion rule. Following this rule, the estimated market capacity
mj  Gj1Ej of province j is allocated to subunits (cities)
c according to their shares in province j’s economic activity.
This allocation rule relies on two hypotheses. The first is the
assumption of homotheticity, so that the expenditure of city
c is given by Ec  ( yc/yj) Ej, where yc/yj is city c’s share
of provincial GDP. The second is that Gj, the supply index,
is approximately constant within provinces—Gc  Gj, for
all cities inside j. The combination of these assumptions
yields the market capacity of each city mc  ( yc/yj)mj.
The province-level market capacity (mj  Gj1Ej 
exp(FMj)) is then allocated to cities inside province j
according to the GDP share23 of each constituent city c:
mc  Gc1Ec  yc/yj mj  yc/yj Gj1Ej
 yc/yj expFMj.
(11)
Note that while the lack of subprovincial trade data forces
us to choose an allocation rule for provincial competition-
weighted expenditure m, the other component of market
access, , uses genuine city-level information.24
Finally, we can compute each city’s market access, which
consists of four components, corresponding to the four sums
in equation (12): local market access, provincial market
access (from all other cities k in the same province),
national market access (from all other Chinese provinces),
and rest of the world (ROW) market access.
Formally, the market access of city c to all regions and
countries j (including itself) is given by:
MAc  ccGc1Ec  
kprovince
ck
yk yk Gj1Ej
 
jChina
cjGj1Ej  
jROW
cjGj1Ej
 distcc  yc/yj expFMj
 
kprovince
distck
yk yk expFMj
 
jChina
distcj exp expFMj
 
jROW
distcj exp Contigrj expFMj,
(12)
where FMj and the parameters , , , and  are estimated
in the trade equation.
IV. Empirical Results for the Wage Equation
A. Wage Equation—Baseline Specification
Having calculated market access at the city level, MAc,
we can now run the regressions of our human-capital
augmented version of the wage equation. Table A4 shows
the summary statistics of all variables used in this section.
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (8) and denoting
individuals by i and cities by c, the econometric baseline
specification becomes
ln wic  a b ln MAc  zic  εic, (13)
where a  (1/) ln [1] and b  1/.
As discussed by Head and Mayer (2006), the intercept, a,
depends on the input requirement coefficients  and .
These are likely to vary across sectors, in part because of
variations in capital intensity. As such, we estimate equation
(13) with industry and later also industry-province specific
constants. Our benchmark estimates are obtained by OLS.
20 As explained in appendix B, the data on interprovincial trade flows are
limited to 1997. For consistency, we decided to rely on trade flows for a
single year, 1997, to calculate the estimates used to compute provincial
market access. Section IV will regress individual wages for 1995 on
market access for 1997. We argue that the associated time discrepancy
should not be a problem because of the relative persistence over time of
market access. The potential problem of reverse causation between wages
in 1995 and market access in 1997 will be addressed in section IV.
21 Importer and exporter fixed effects are included in the regression, so
that the border effect within foreign countries ( ln distrj  ) is captured
by their fixed effects. The reference category in the regression is within-
China provincial trade.
22 The entire country is divided into 27 provinces plus four “supercities”
with province status: Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. The
urban population is further divided into prefecture-level and county-level
cities. Our data set consists of information on individuals in prefecture-
level cities or county cities.
23 The GDP shares are obtained from the China’s State Statistical
Bureau.
24 In section IV, we will check that our results do not significantly change
according to the choice of the indicator (GDP, population or living
expenses) used to apportion provincial market capacity and that they also
hold after controlling for local price differences directly in the regression.
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Out of the 6,848 individuals in our sample, 769 do not
report current wages or working hours.25 To ensure that our
wage results are not affected by selection bias, we use a
Heckman procedure to see whether the probability of re-
porting nonzero wages is exogenous (Heckman, 1976).26
The results do not reject the absence of selection bias, so we
resort to OLS.
The structure of our data raises the problem of clustering
of errors. We suspect that the observable and unobservable
characteristics of the various wage earners within the same
location and industry may be correlated. Moulton (1986,
1990) emphasizes that the typical OLS measures of variance
could understate errors by a potentially large factor, leading
to poor inference. In this paper, we correct for the correla-
tion of errors between individuals within a specific province
and industry, using Rogers’s (1993) correction.
A final econometric problem arises from the two-step
calculation of market access. This variable is calculated
from parameters that are themselves estimated with stan-
dard errors in an initial regression. We correct for biased
standard errors by applying the bootstrap procedure to each
of our regressions.
Our estimated specification can be thought of as a Mincer
equation augmented to include NEG market access. It is
thus worth checking that our results on the basic determi-
nants of wages (years of school, age, work experience,
gender, and Communist Party membership), are consistent
with the correlations found in the existing literature.
The first column of table 1 reports the results of a wage
regression using these variables and industry dummies. All
of the variables have a significant impact on wages, explain-
ing 15% of the difference in wages between individuals.
This specification corresponds to Mincerian (hourly) earn-
ings functions (Mincer, 1974). Our results are consistent
with the vast labor economics literature applied to China.
Specifically, our estimates confirm the very low wage re-
turns to education in China. Our estimated rate of return to
education is 3.4%, which falls in the 2% to 5% range
obtained by Chen, De´murger, and Fournier (2005) and Zhao
(2002), among others. These estimated returns are consid-
erably lower than both the 10.1% world average and the
9.6% Asian average, as well as the 11.2% to 11.7% range for
low- and middle-income countries (Psacharopoulos, 1994).
Our empirical results on gender-wage differentials (to the
detriment of women) and on returns to experience also
correspond to those found in the literature (Chen, De´murger,
& Fournier, 2007). We furthermore confirm the significant
impact of belonging to the Communist Party (Li, 2003).
Communist Party membership raises wages by about 9%.
Adding market access as an independent variable in
column 2 leads to an increase of 7 percentage points in the
R2, so that market access contributes significantly to the
explanation of wage differentials. The estimated coefficients
on the other variables remain similar to those in the first
column.
Our aim is to determine whether these results also apply
to cities within the same province.27 Therefore, the regres-
sions from column 3 in table 1 on are all performed with
province-industry fixed effects. We also control for the
clustering of error terms at this level. China being a country
with significant differences between provinces in terms of
policies, endowments, and development, the province-
industry fixed effects will take into account this heteroge-
neity and purge the market access impact of any specific
effects of provinces or industries on individual wages.
We find that even after introducing province-industry
fixed effects, market access remains statistically significant
at the 1% level and has a coefficient of around 0.14. On
average, a 1 standard deviation increase in the market access
of a city would lead to an average increase in individual
wages of 29%.
In columns 4 and 5 of table 1, we introduce fixed effects
to control for firm ownership28 and workers’ occupational
category.29 The coefficients on the dummies for firm own-
ership in column 4 reproduce the results found in earlier
work, in particular, Chen et al. (2005), who use the same
data set as we do. Chen et al. show that both foreign-
invested firms (including both foreign- and Sino-foreign
owned enterprises) and state-owned firms (SOEs) pay
higher wages than do firms with other owners,30 while SOEs
provide the highest levels of bonuses and subsidies.31
25 In the original sample, 8,523 individuals work in the three nonagri-
cultural tradable sectors we consider. Of these, the exact location of 909
individuals is unknown, and 191 have missing data on schooling or work
experience. We further limit our sample to individuals aged between
sixteen and sixty, thereby excluding 465 additional observations. In
addition, we exclude 80 individuals who say that they are self-employed
(in single-person enterprises), since profits and wages cannot be properly
distinguished in this case. Finally, to ensure that our estimation results are
not driven by outliers, we rely on Hadi’s (1994) method in all regressions
to identify multiple outliers; this procedure excludes thirty observations in
the wage data. Of the 6,848 remaining individuals, 769 do not provide
information on wages or working hours or declare zero wages.
26 This selection issue actually covers two separate phenomena: those
who are currently working but do not provide a figure for wages and those
who report a sector and work experience but are not currently working.
We appeal to five variables (a dummy “married” interacted with gender,
nonlabor income, household wealth, and size) that we imagine affect the
probability of reporting a wage figure but have no impact on the actual
level of wages. For space reasons, we do not report the results here, but
they are available on S.P.’s Web site.
27 Up to this stage, no province dummies have been introduced, so that
the estimations focus on differences among the 56 cities, whatever their
province of location.
28 Ownership types cover state-owned enterprises at the central or
provincial level (central SOEs), local publicly owned enterprises (local
SOEs), urban collective enterprises, private enterprises, foreign-invested
enterprises, Sino-foreign joint ventures, and others.
29 The categories here are owner of private or individual enterprise,
owner and manager of private enterprise, professional or technical worker,
head of institution, division head in institution, office worker, skilled
worker, unskilled worker, and others.
30 The omitted category in columns 4 and 5 is private firms.
31 Zhao (2002) highlights the higher nonwage benefits provided by SOEs
(e.g., pensions, housing, and health care) as a key explanation for the
immobility across different ownership enterprises in China.
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The impact of additional control variables on the estimate
of our market access variable in columns 4 and 5 is negli-
gible. However, the introduction of dummies for occupa-
tional category leads to a logical decrease in the size of our
estimated returns to schooling, which is now purged by the
wage premium obtained in better work positions. In the
following, we will refer to the estimated wage elasticity to
market access of 0.14 found in column 5 of table 1 as our
benchmark figure.
The structural derivation of our market access variable
from theory provides us with a theoretical interpretation of
its coefficient. Theoretically, this figure corresponds to 1/,
with  being a measure of product differentiation, increas-
ing returns to scale, and the degree of competition on the
market (Head & Mayer, 2004). Our estimate of 0.14 corre-
sponds to   7.1, which is in line with the results in the
literature. Empirical estimates of  lie typically between 5
and 10, depending on the estimation methodology (Erkel-
Rousse & Mirza, 2002; Head & Ries, 2001).
In his study on market access impact on individual wages
in Brazil, Paillacar (2006) reports results very similar to
ours. Findings of a similar magnitude of wage elasticity to
market access in two countries that are quite different in
terms of labor mobility could be disappointing. However,
one should note that the two studies differ significantly,
notably in the level of geographical aggregation. Whereas
Paillacar analyzes the impact of market access at the state
level (which corresponds to the provincial level in China),
our study applies to a lower geographical unit, the cities.32
Findings of similar wage elasticities to market access in
Paillacar and in this study are thus not incompatible with the
theoretical expectation of a greater impact of market access
on wages in a context of greater barriers to migration.
City-level data for Brazil or a survey covering all Chinese
provinces could provide definite evidence on this question.
32 While one would anticipate impediments to interstate or interprovin-
cial migration to be greater in China than in Brazil, it is less clear what to
expect when comparing labor mobility between cities of the same prov-
ince in China and between states in Brazil. Indeed, labor mobility is much
more intense within provinces than between provinces in China. At least
two-thirds of migration flows in China in the 1990s occurred within the
same province (Du, Park, & Wang, 2005).
TABLE 1.—BENCHMARK WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATIONS
Explained Variable: Individual Hourly Wage
1 2 3 4 5
Market Access 0.088 0.144 0.137 0.136
(0.010)** (0.044)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)***
Individual variables
Female 0.114 0.114 0.115 0.092 0.091
(0.016)** (0.019)** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)***
Years of schooling 0.034 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.019
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Experience 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016
(0.003)** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Age 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.074 0.073
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Communist 0.087 0.100 0.090 0.082 0.070
(0.019)** (0.020)** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.024)***
Firm ownership
Central SOE 0.495 0.504
(0.149)*** (0.139)***
Local SOE 0.286 0.294
(0.147)* (0.137)**
Urban collective 0.146 0.159
(0.153) (0.142)
Sino-foreign 0.471 0.479
(0.137)*** (0.126)***
Foreign 0.835 0.846
(0.185)*** (0.175)***
Others 0.395 0.404
(0.177)** (0.166)**
Constant 0.911 0.450 0.166 0.627 0.543
(0.239)* (0.189) (0.189) (0.208)*** (0.199)**
Occupation dummies No No No No Yes
Fixed Effects Sector Sector and Province
Observations 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079
R2 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.20
Number of clusters 3 3 33 33 33
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the industry or province-industry level. The reported R2 is the within R2, which
indicates how much of the variation of wages within the group of sectors is explained by our regressors.
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So far, our results have not addressed the potential simul-
taneity problem. Market access, on the right-hand side of
the estimated equation, is a weighted sum of all potential
expenditures, including local ones. Those expenditures de-
pend on income, and therefore on wages, raising the con-
cern of reverse causality in the estimation. Since a positive
shock to wi will raise Ec and consequently increase MAc,
we rely on a twofold approach to ensure the reliability of
our estimates. First, we follow Head and Mayer (2006) and
instrument our market access variable by two measures of
centrality. We compute Chinese centrality and international
centrality at the city level as the sum of the inverted
distances of each city in our sample to the center of every
inhabited 1 degree  1 degree cell in the Chinese and in the
world population grid, respectively.33
The coefficient of market access based on the IV esti-
mates is shown in row 2 of table 2, which compares our
benchmark figure (column 5 in table 3, reported in row 1 in
table 2) with estimates obtained from different specifica-
tions. Hansen’s J-test of overidentifying restrictions does
not significantly reject the validity of our instruments.34 We
find that the IV estimate is not significantly different from
the benchmark figure obtained with OLS.35
Our second focus is on the potential bias induced by our
ad hoc allocation rule. We therefore recompute market
access to check the appropriateness of using GDP shares to
calculate the local and provincial component of market
access. Rows 3 and 4 display the results when population or
living expenditures instead of GDP are used to apportion
provincial market capacity. These results are similar to those
obtained before and strengthen our confidence in the results
of the benchmark estimation.
Row 5 replaces market access by the Harris (1954)
measure of market potential, defined as j Ec/distcj. This
indicator, which has frequently been used in empirical work
because of its ease of calculation, is typically found to have
a larger coefficient than structural estimates of MA. Our
finding of a higher wage elasticity with Harris market
potential than our market access measure is thus consistent
with the existing literature (Head & Mayer, 2006).
In the last row, we report our estimates using total annual
wages as the dependent variable. The results remain the
same, suggesting that controlling for working hours does
not alter the estimated impact of market access on wages.
All of the estimates in table 2 correspond to a value of 
between 5 (the value typically used in Krugman’s illustra-
tions of NEG) and 10. The only exception is found for the
Harris measure, which does not, however, retain the struc-
tural interpretation of the coefficient on log market poten-
tial.
Having found a theoretically consistent, positive, and
significant impact of market access on hourly wages, we can
conclude that the wage disparities within provinces partly
reflect differences in cities’ market access. Growing differ-
ences in trade costs or market sizes between cities can
therefore increase intraprovincial wage disparities.
B. Market Access, Size Effect, and Other Controls
According to the above estimates, we might conclude that
the spatial variation of wages in China is consistent with our
NEG model. However, since our only variable at the city
level is market access, its impact could also capture features
consistent with urban agglomeration theories. Hanson
(2003) distinguishes three additional mechanisms apart
from market access linking agglomeration and wages: non-
human factor endowments, increasing returns external to
firms, and human capital externalities. With respect to the
first mechanism, we continue to assume that differences in
institutions and technology are more likely to occur at the
provincial and industry levels and do not control for local
differences. The second and third mechanisms correspond
to two main competing dynamics relating to agglomeration.
On the one hand, the larger or denser is an agglomeration (in
terms of labor), the more knowledge spillovers there are
between firms and workers. This leads to higher worker
productivity and therefore higher wages. On the other hand,
large agglomerations often exert downward pressure on
prices because of tougher competition between a greater
number of producers. A lower price level drives down
wages. Big cities are therefore exposed to these two con-
tradictory forces.
So far, we have insufficiently controlled for these aspects.
It is thus possible that our significant market access result
captures the size effect caused by spillovers between firms
or human capital externalities. The regression in column 1
of table 3 introduces the natural logarithm of the local
population as a proxy for city size. The impact of MAc stays
unchanged, whereas population is insignificant. This might
be due to the fact that the two competing forces presented
above cancel each other out.
In the second column, we introduce a proxy for the city’s
human capital stock. This indicator, skill intensity, is com-
puted as the city’s share of individuals in the survey having
completed at least nine years of schooling (which corre-
sponds in general to the end of lower middle school). Its
33 For more details on the instruments, see Head and Mayer (2006).
34 Significance is judged at the 10% confidence level.
35 The Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of exoge-
neity of our market access variable at the 10% confidence level.
TABLE 2.—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Market Access Variable Elasticity
Standard
Deviation
1 Market Access (MAc) 0.136*** 0.037
2 IV: Centrality 0.158*** 0.032
Hansen Test-statistic: 0.13 Wu Hausman: 0.44
3 MAc(living costs) 0.146*** 0.032
4 MAc(population) 0.205*** 0.062
5 Harris 0.793*** 0.310
6 Annual earnings 0.126*** 0.032
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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coefficient is positive but insignificant, while the coefficient
of MAc remains unaffected.
In column 3 of table 3, we let the market access variable
compete with an indicator of human capital externalities
with spatial decay.36 The indicator spatial decay for each
city is constructed as the distance-weighted sum of the
population share enrolled in middle school over all cities of
the same province, including itself.37 While the indicator
enters with a positive and significant sign, attesting to the
presence of positive human capital externalities on individ-
ual wages, it does not alter our original results. We conclude
that our results confirm the validity of NEG theory in China
even after scale and human capital effects have been ac-
counted for.
Finally, we investigate the possibility that the impact of
MAc on nominal wages is due to the provision by firms of
greater subsidies for housing and other living costs (re-
quired by workers to accommodate higher living costs due
to agglomeration effects) instead of higher salaries reflect-
ing the increase in profits due to lower transportation costs.
Besides the effect emphasized by the NEG (firms in
locations with higher market access incur lower overall
transportation costs and thus are able to pay higher wages),
Dekle and Eaton (2002) propose an alternative mechanism
relying on agglomeration economics that might explain the
positive impact of market access on wages. It could be the
case that greater demand pushes up the price of land (or
other immobile inputs) and thus induces firms to raise
nominal wages to maintain workers’ purchasing power.
While theoretically both effects are combined in our model,
since labor is the only immobile factor, it is empirically
important to account for this channel. We include in column
4 a proxy for city-level living costs, living costs, calculated
as the average of the values reported in the survey on the
monthly cost of maintaining a minimum standard of living
for the household.
This indicator enters positively and significantly, leading
to a reduction in the size and significance of our market
access variable. However, this does not change the flavor of
our results. The coefficient of 0.016 indicates that an in-
36 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
37 The indicator for city c equals jprovince Enrollment ratioj/distcj. Data
come from the Urban Statistical Yearbook, published by China’s State
Statistical Bureau.
TABLE 3.—MARKET ACCESS VERSUS URBAN AGGLOMERATION THEORY
Explained Variable: Individual Hourly Wage
1 2 3 4 5
Market access 0.130 0.125 0.099 0.069 0.052
(0.042)*** (0.037)*** (0.045)** (0.026)** (0.028)*
City variables
Population 0.010 0.015
(0.030) (0.025)
Skill intensity 0.185 0.068
(0.181) (0.220)
Spatial decay 0.029 0.022
(0.017)* (0.014)
Living costs 0.016 0.017
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Individual variables
Female 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.090 0.091
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Years of schooling 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Experience 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Age 0.073 0.072 0.074 0.073 0.073
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Communist 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069
(0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
Constant 0.615 0.498 0.711 1.185 1.236
(0.337)* (0.188)** (0.200)*** (0.206)*** (0.270)***
Ownership dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector and Province
Observations 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21
Number of groups 33 33 33 33 33
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the industry or province-industry level. The reported R2 is the within R2, which
indicates how much of the variation of wages within the group of sectors is explained by our regressors.
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crease of 1 standard deviation in living costs38 leads to an
increase of 12% in wages. This corresponds to an increase
of 55 yuan over the average monthly wage of 465 yuan.
In the last column, we combine the impact of all four
variables. Here also the coefficient on MAc remains signif-
icant, although only at the 10% level.
C. Heterogeneous Influence of Market Access
One novel contribution of our paper is to investigate the
possibility that the relationship between market access and
wages depends on workers’ skills and firm ownership types.
Market Access Impact: Skills Matter. In table 4, we run
separate regressions for high-skilled and low-skilled work-
ers. An individual is considered high skilled if he or she has
completed at least nine years of schooling; otherwise the
individual is classified as a low-skilled worker. In a com-
parison of columns 1 and 2, the impact of market access
does not seem to be significantly different between these
two groups, even though the coefficient is lower and sig-
nificant only at the 5% level for low-skilled wage earners. In
the next four columns, we introduce living costs and the
city’s percentage of skilled workers. We see that once we
control for living costs, the wages of high-skilled workers
rise significantly with market access, whereas the coefficient
of MAc for low-skilled workers becomes insignificant. This
indicates that although nominal wages increase with market
access for all workers, as seen in columns 1 and 2, the
increase for low-skilled workers corresponds mainly to the
increase in living costs. Thus, these results suggest that a
rise in market access leads to an increase in wages in real
terms only for high-skilled workers.
The comparison of columns 1 and 2 indicates that the
determinants of wages differ between the two groups. No-
tably there seems to be no return to schooling and no wage
premium from Communist Party membership for unskilled
workers. Furthermore, the gender-wage gap seems to be
reduced for the highly skilled.
We argue that high-skilled workers are likely to benefit
differentially from market access because they are less at
risk from migrants who in the majority have low skills.
Surveys on migrants to cities in China stress that the
segregation of workers according to their residence permit
38 An increase of 1 standard deviation corresponds to a rise in the living
cost index of 72 yuan per month.
TABLE 4.—MARKET ACCESS AND WAGES: THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION
Explained Variable: Individual Hourly Wage
High Skilled Low Skilled High Skilled Low Skilled High Skilled Low Skilled
1 2 3 4 5 6
Market access 0.142 0.116 0.080 0.029 0.085 0.026
(0.047)*** (0.046)** (0.037)** (0.042) (0.038)** (0.043)
City variables
Living costs 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.02
(0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)***
Skill intensity 0.175 0.110
(0.177) (0.229)
Individual variables
Female 0.071 0.151 0.071 0.152 0.070 0.151
(0.016)*** (0.038)*** (0.017)*** (0.039)*** (0.017)*** (0.039)***
Years of schooling 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.014
(0.003)*** (0.010) (0.003)*** (0.010) (0.003)*** (0.010)
Experience 0.012 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.021
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Age 0.073 0.081 0.072 0.080 0.073 0.079
(0.009)*** (0.021)*** (0.008)*** (0.019)*** (0.008)*** (0.018)***
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Communist 0.080 0.021 0.080 0.009 0.080 0.008
(0.025)*** (0.057) (0.024)*** (0.054) (0.024)*** (0.054)
Constant 0.530 0.634 1.137 1.536 1.212 1.463
(0.225)** (0.491) (0.226)*** (0.550)*** (0.223)*** (0.494)***
Ownership dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector and Province
Observations 4,656 1,423 4,656 1,423 4,656 1,423
R2 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.19
Number of groups 33 33 33 33 33 33
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the industry or province-industry level. The reported R2 is the within R2, which
indicates how much of the variation of wages within the group of sectors is explained by our regressors.
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(hukou) makes it difficult for rural residents to find formal
employment in urban areas.39 Park, Zhao, and Huang (2006)
find a strong effect of hukou status on the occupational
choice of nonagricultural workers. Most of these can find
only jobs that are temporary and physically demanding (Cai
& Wang, 2003).
The finding of a larger effect of market access on wages
for skilled workers is thus consistent with the NEG model,
which predicts that the relationship between market access
and wages will be weaker as migration is stronger. This
relates to the two mechanisms by which the local economy
can adjust to a change in the demand for its goods: quanti-
tative adjustment, with new workers filling in positions to
meet the additional demand, or, in the case of insufficient
labor mobility, adjustment achieved by a change in prices,
which means that wages will rise with market access.
Our results suggest that the first mechanism is stronger in
the case of low-skilled jobs and a highly competitive labor
market. Regulations such as governmental prohibition of
enterprises from hiring migrants in certain jobs and posts
may protect skilled workers to a greater extent.
Market Access Impact: The Influence of Firm Ownership.
In 1995, while the number of private firms started to grow
rapidly, a very high percentage of registered employment
was still in publicly owned enterprises.40 When looking at
the interaction between MAc and firm ownership, we would
expect different impacts for different types of ownership:
private, recently created firms should be more flexible in
terms of wages and react more to market shocks than
state-owned firms. This intuition is confirmed by the results
reported in table 5. Here, we interact MAc with firm own-
ership dummies in order to see whether the impact of
market access varies across different firm types.
We find that, on the one hand, wages in foreign-owned
firms react more strongly to changes in market access than
do those in other firm types. On the other hand, there is a
significantly lower-than-average impact of MAc on wages
for SOEs, whether they are owned at the central or the local
level. The extremely high sensitivity of wages to market
access in the case of foreign-owned firms should be handled
with care, since the number of observations in this group is
very small.
When living costs are introduced into the regression,
nearly all market access coefficients fall, and the estimates
for central SOEs and “others” become insignificant, indi-
cating that in these firms, nominal wages increase only to
keep workers’ purchasing power constant. These results are
robust to the introduction of other control variables. The
tests at the bottom of the table highlight the existence of a
significant difference between firm ownership types.
Wages in foreign firms react the most strongly to varia-
tions in demand, followed by private, Sino-foreign, urban
collective, others, and publicly owned enterprises. This
hierarchy is consistent with work on the structure of the
Chinese economy, which emphasizes the coexistence of
enterprises facing very different institutional and economic
environments. While employment and wage setting in non-
state enterprises are mainly driven by market forces, SOEs
still operate according to the central administration plan and
39 A full description of labor market conditions and migration patterns
within China (across and within provinces) is beyond the scope of this
paper. Interested readers should refer to Cai, Park, and Zhao (2007) and
Du et al. (2005). Data from the 1995 population census indicate that
intraprovincial migration to cities is a major component of migration
across China: 17.3 million people engaged in intraprovincial migration to
cities between 1990 and 1995. This corresponds to 52% of total migration
flows recorded within and between provinces over the period.
40 Out of our 6,079 individuals, 4,611 work in either central or local
SOEs.
TABLE 5.—MARKET ACCESS AND WAGES: THE EFFECT OF FIRM OWNERSHIP
Explained Variable: Individual Wage
per Hour
1 2 3
Market access
MA  Foreign 0.511 0.539 0.539
(0.075)*** (0.085)*** (0.082)***
MA  Private 0.197 0.127 0.128
(0.056)*** (0.051)** (0.052)**
MA  Sino-foreign 0.158 0.096 0.098
(0.038)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)***
MA  Urban collective 0.151 0.086 0.088
(0.030)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)***
MA  Local SOE 0.137 0.068 0.071
(0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)***
MA  Others 0.130 0.064 0.066
(0.049)** (0.041) (0.042)
MA  Central SOE 0.104 0.042 0.045
(0.049)** (0.035) (0.035)
City variables
Living costs 0.017 0.017
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Skill intensity 0.070
(0.185)
Individual variables
Female 0.091 0.090 0.090
(0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Years of schooling 0.018 0.016 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Experience 0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Age 0.073 0.073 0.073
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Communist 0.073 0.072 0.072
(0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
Constant 0.332 0.987 1.025
(0.236) (0.262)*** (0.232)***
Ownership dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector and Province
Observations 6,079 6,079 6,079
R2 0.20 0.22 0.22
Number of groups 33 33 33
Private  Central SOE 3.98* 3.31* 3.35*
Private  Foreign 14.22*** 18.98*** 19.66***
Local SOE  Foreign 23.48*** 27.97*** 29.75***
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard error in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the industry or province-industry level. The reported R2 is the within R2, which
indicates how much of the variation of wages within the group of sectors is explained by our regressors.
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are characterized by overstaffing (Lin, Cai, & Li, 2001). The
lower impact of market access on wages in these enterprises
might be explained by their worker surplus, as in the event
of a rise in demand, they can resort to their underemployed
workers. The adjustment is internal to the firm and occurs
without resorting to new employment or paying high over-
time wages (Knight & Song, 2005).
V. Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of economic geog-
raphy on the spatial structure of wages in China. It has
attempted to explain interindividual wage differences by the
individual’s location proximity to markets. We control for
gender and age as well as individual skills in terms of
experience and education, which are expected to explain an
important part of spatial wage variations. Following the
literature pointing out the importance of factor endowments
in spatial wage disparities, province and sector fixed effects
and proxies for living costs and human capital externalities
are introduced. Even after controlling for these factors, the
relationship between the city’s market access, calculated
using a gravity equation, and individual Chinese wages is
positive and significant.
The finding of a significant impact of market access on
individual wage data validates the pioneering results of
Redding and Venables (2004) on aggregate data and justifies
the inclusion of this variable in research on wage differen-
tials. Our results also highlight that the impact of MAc
cannot be generalized, since the relationship between mar-
ket access and wages holds only for high-profile workers
and for certain firm types. Wages earned in foreign firms,
and to a lesser extent in private and Sino-foreign firms, react
strongly to changes in MAc, while wages in central SOEs
seem to be largely insensitive to them when controlling for
living costs. This means that, probably due to the remnants
of central economic planning, the impact of market access is
limited in the Chinese economy. We conclude that interre-
gional and intraprovincial wage disparities likely partly
reflect differences in market access. Considering that market
access also has a significant international component, it is
likely that with further integration into the world economy,
these disparities will grow if access to new markets is not
evenly distributed across the country. Our results here sug-
gest that any further opening of the country, without increas-
ing liberalization of internal migration, may worsen the
already pervasive spatial wage disparities. Nevertheless, the
impact of market access could change over time. More
research with data spanning a number of years is needed to
ascertain the evolution of wages in response to changing
market access. An important issue is whether the relaxation
of restrictions on internal migration will eventually mitigate
the segmentation of the labor market and dampen the impact
of market access, promoting the equalization of wages
across the Chinese territory for given skills and factor
endowments.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1.—CITIES
Provinces Cities
Beijing Beijing
Shanxi Changzhi, Datong, Fenyang, Taiyuan, Yangquan
Liaoning Dalian, Jinzhou, Shenyang
Jiangsu Changzhou, Dafeng, Nanjing, Nantong, Suqian, Taixing,
Wuxi, Xuzhou, Yixing
Anhui Bengbu, Bozhou, Hefei, Huainan, Tongcheng, Wuhu
Henan Huixian, Kaifeng, Pingdingshan, Xiangcheng, Xinxiang,
Zhengzhou
Hubei Honghu, Huangshi, Macheng, Tianmen, Wuhan, Xiangfan
Guangdong Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Puning, Shenzhen, Shunde,
Zhanjiang, Zhaoqing
Sichuan Chengdu, Guangyuan, Leshan, Luzhou, Zigong
Yunnan Dali, Gejiu, Kunming, Xuanwei
Gansu Lanzhou, Pingliang, Wuwei
MAP A1.—PROVINCIAL MARKET CAPACITIES
Made with Philcarto—http://perso.club-internet.fr/philgeo.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS158
APPENDIX B
Data
International trade flows are in current USD. These are obtained from
the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
Internal trade flows are in current USD and are calculated as the
difference between domestic primary and secondary sector production
minus exports. Production data for OECD countries come from the OECD
STAN database. For other countries, ratios of industry and agriculture
output in percentages of GDP are extracted from Datastream. They are
then multiplied by the countries’ GDP (in current USD) from World
Development Indicators 2005.
Intraprovincial trade flows for China and intranational trade flows for
foreign countries are computed, following Wei (1996), as domestic pro-
duction minus total exports. Total production for Chinese provinces is
computed as the sum of industrial and agricultural output. Output in yuan
is converted into current USD using the annual exchange rate. All
statistics come from the China Statistical Yearbook (various years).
Provincial input-output (IO) tables provide the decomposition of pro-
vincial output, international and domestic trade of tradable goods.41
Domestic trade flows, that is trade between each province and the rest of
China, were obtained for 1997.42 The rest of China, denoted by roC, is
different for each province considered and can be thought of as a distinct
country whose characteristics (distance to partners distrroC) are gener-
ated from the characteristics of the provinces that make it up. See Poncet
(2005) for more details.
The provincial foreign trade data are obtained from the Customs General
Administration database, which records the value of all of the import or export
transactions through customs. Provincial imports and exports are decomposed
into up to 230 international partners. We rely on data for 1997. The database
is discussed in Lin (2005) and Feenstra et al. (1998). Statistics on GDP, land
area and population at the city and province level come mainly from two
sources: the Urban Statistical Yearbook, various issues, published by China’s
State Statistical Bureau, and China City Statistics, data for county cities.
These data are collected by China’s State Statistical Bureau and are down-
loadable (for a fee) at http://chinadataonline.org.
41 Most Chinese provinces produced square input-output tables for 1997.
A few of them are published in provincial statistical yearbooks. We
obtained access to the final-demand columns of these matrices from the
input-output division in China’s National Bureau of Statistics.
42 Provincial input-output tables are available for 28 provinces, as data
are missing for Tibet, Hainan, and Chongqing. Four provinces (Anhui,
Heilongjiang, Shandong and Guizhou) list only net outflows and are thus
not useful for studying interprovincial trade. Nine provinces separate
inflows and outflows into domestic and foreign sectors. Poncet (2005)
deduced domestic trade flows for the other provinces using industry-level
provincial import and export data from the General Administration of
Customs. These data match the data reported as international trade by
provinces that separate international and domestic transactions in their
input-output tables. This finding gives us some confidence in the method
used, as input-output tables and customs data seem to use consistent
methodologies.
TABLE A3.—TRADE EQUATION ESTIMATIONS
Explained Variable:
Ln (Exports) in 1997
Ln distance 1.528
(0.024)***
Contiguity 1.162
(0.123)***
Interforeign country
border effect
1.731
(0.320)***
China-foreign country
border effect
3.681
(0.353)***
Intra-China border
effect
2.766
(0.780)***
Constant 19.488
(0.440)***
Fixed Effects Exporter and Importer
Observations 22,290
Number of importers 270
Within R2 0.59
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
TABLE A4.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variables Mean Median S.D.
Market access 0.072 0.006 0.15
Years of schooling 10.25 10 2.72
Experience 19.13 20 19.14
Age 35.95 39 9.26
Age2 1,526.08 1,521 702.99
Female 0.47 0 0.50
Communist 0.1845 0 0.39
TABLE A2.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HOURLY WAGES (IN YUAN) BY PROVINCE
All Beijing Shanxi Liaoning Jiangsu Anhui
Observations 6,079 402 537 701 872 511
Mean 2.99 3.72 2.50 3.13 3.05 2.48
Standard deviation 4.26 1.91 1.45 5.82 1.85 2.42
Median 2.5 3.55 2.21 2.48 2.72 2.07
Henan Hubei Guangdong Sichuan Yunnan Gansu
Observations 495 601 558 710 396 296
Mean 2.22 2.76 5.13 2.76 2.62 1.97
Standard deviation 2.15 1.75 10.90 2.06 1.08 1.54
Median 1.83 2.46 3.99 2.35 2.51 1.62
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